XXVI. (114) There are some men, again, who, having armed and strongly fortified both their hands in a most hard and terrible manner, like iron, attack their adversaries, and batter their heads and faces, and the other parts of their bodies, and whenever they are able to plant a blow, they inflict great fractures, and then claim the decision in their favour, and the crown of victory, by means of their merciless cruelty. (115) But what man in his senses would not laugh at the other competitions of runners, and candidates for the prize in the pentathlum, to see men studying with all their energies to leap the longest distance, and measuring spaces and distances, and contending with one another in swiftness of foot? men whom, not only those more active animals, an antelope, or a deer, but even the very smallest beasts, such as a dog, or a hare, without making any extraordinary haste, would outrun, though they were to exert themselves with all their speed, and to put themselves out of breath. (116) Of all these contests, then, there is not one which is truly sacred; no, not though all the men in the world should combine to bear witness in their favour, but they must be convicted by themselves of bearing false witness if they do so: for they who admire these things have established laws against men who behave with insolent violence, and have affixed punishments to assaults, and have appointed judges to decide on every action of that kind. (117) How, then, is it natural for the same persons to be indignant at those who insult and assault others privately, and to establish in their cases punishments which cannot be avoided, but yet, in the case of those who commit these assaults publicly, and in assemblies of the people, and in theatres, to establish by law that they shall receive crowns, and that proclamations shall be made in their honour, and all sorts of other glorious circumstances? (118) For when two opposite opinions are established concerning any one thing, whether it be person or action, it follows of necessity that one or other of them must be wrong, and the other right, for it is impossible for them both to be right: which is the two, then, will you praise deservedly? Will you not say that that sentence is right which orders those who begin acts of violence to be punished? You would justly blame the contrary law, which commands such persons to be honoured; that nothing sacred may be blamed, every such thing must be altogether glorious.