36 James M. Robinson, A New Quest, chapter II.
37 Schweitzer, Quest, pp. 3–4.
38 It should be noted that the other major approach to miracles that we outlined in Chapter 1, the mythical strategy of David Strauss, is very similar at this point to Bultmann’s position that we just covered above.
39 Schweitzer, Quest, pp. 49–55.
40 See Gary R. Habermas, “Skepticism: Hume” in Biblical Errancy: An Analysis of its Philosophical Roots, ed. by Norman L. Geisler (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1981), pp. 23– 49 for an examination and critique of Hume’s argument against belief in miracles and their relation to the laws of nature, as well as an evaluation of a number of other scholars who are inspired by Hume’s account. See also Richard Swinburne, The Concept of Miracle (London: Macmillan, 1970).
medical science, criminal justice, and journalism. Historians also investigate the known facts to find whether an event actually happened or not.^41
As former Oxford lecturer William Wand remarks, there is no scholarly reason for rejecting possibilities before an investigation. An a prioridismissal cannot be allowed, even if we do not like the conclusion that is indicated by the facts. One must decide on the basis of the known evidence.^42
Then if miracles cannot be rejected without an investigation, on what grounds can we accept part of the Gospel record and reject part of it? Such picking and choosing seems arbitrary unless there is some objective criterion for determining such a practice.
For reasons such as these, conclusions that are drawn before and against the facts are both non-historical and non-scientific. To rule out the possibility of miracles a prioriis not a valid procedure. We must investigate the evidence and then draw our conclusions.